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INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis' metaphoric argument "Sunlight is said
to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman" is
regarded by many as a truism.' The Securities Act of 1933 (characterized as a
disclosure statute) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are based on this
assumption. 2 President Roosevelt opted for disclosure rather than attempt to
establish as federal statute the merit regulation of securities sales that had
been enacted in the blue sky laws adopted in about half the states. As he put
it in his message to Congress supporting the 1933 Act:'
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new
securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full pub-
licity and information, and that no essentially important element attending
the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doc-
trine, "Let the seller also beware." It puts the burden of telling the whole truth
on the seller. It should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and there-
by bring back public confidence.
The 1934 Act, though not explicitly called a disclosure statute, has evolved
into the more demanding of the two Acts. As amended, it requires annual
disclosure of a large amount of financial data, more limited quarterly state-
ments, monthly reports of "significant" events, proxy information, and so
forth. The extent and form of disclosure required has expanded greatly in
the past several years to include product-line data, compensating balance ar-
rangements for loans, and most recently the replacement costs of large corpo-
rations' fixed assets. There is every reason to believe that more rather than
less specific disclosure of data will be required as a consequence of the review
of disclosure policies recently completed.4
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The disclosure requirements for most corporations (all those with more
than 500 shareholders or $1 million in assets) are based in large measure on
the assumption that investors would be insufficiently served were the laws and
regulations not in place and administered by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. In brief, the benefits which are assumed to flow from these re-
quirements are: less fraud on investors, better administration of the reporting
corporations, more equitable and efficient capital markets, and a more effi-
cient allocation of resources in the economy. In addition, it is claimed that
government officials require the data made public by corporations to improve
the administration of their offices and their management of the economy.
This latter presumed benefit is one of the major motivating forces behind
other enacted and proposed legislation that requires public disclosure by pri-
vate enterprises. In particular, many regulated industries have long had to
report detailed data on their operations to supervisory commissions. Railroads
report to the Interstate Commerce Commission, utilities to public service
commissions, insurance companies to state agencies, banks to federal and state
agencies, etc. There are two predominant reasons for this type of reporting
requirement. One is that the companies enjoy a natural or government-cre-
ated monopoly, and hence their operations, management, revenues, costs,
assets, liabilities, and financing must be revealed to the agencies charged with
their regulation. The other is that financial institutions, such as banks and
insurance companies, are guardians of the public's funds and hence must be
scrutinized by the public's servants.
The New Deal promulgated another reason for requiring that private
companies report to government. While the public and the government offi-
cials generally believed that the "invisible hand" of profit-oriented decisions
by business persons and consumers resulted in the optimal allocation of re-
sources (except in natural or government-franchised monopolies), there was
little reason for government to gather and use private financial data other
than for tax collection. But once this view was replaced with the belief that
private enterprise was not working well and that government officials should
manage the economy, extensive reporting of data on business and other
operations was considered necessary. Furthermore, the concern that the
economy was characterized more by oligopolies which administered prices
than by competing enterprises led to a demand by government agencies such
as the Federal Trade Commission for detailed data on market and industry
shipments, sales, advertising, profits, investments, and so forth.
Finally, the recent revelations of corporate misbehavior, particularly with
respect to illegal domestic political contributions and questionable overseas
payments, have increased demands that the operations of larger corporations
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, printed for the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
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be subject to greater public scrutiny.5 These demands are but continuations of
a movement prevalent at least since the 1930's to require private enterprises
to disclose their financial and other data to government agencies and to the
public.
In light of what appears to be a strong public preference for more rather
than less disclosure, it might seem foolish to question whether the costs of
required corporate disclosure exceed the benefits. Few people can recall a
time when the SEC did not exist, and therefore few may even be able to
imagine a situation in which corporations would not have to file S-I's when they
sell stock and periodically file 10K's, 10Q's, 8K's, etc. Government officials,
such as those who attempt to manage the energy situation, must bemoan the
paucity of data that are reported to them, rather than the reverse. The FTC in
particular is attempting to implement a massive data collection effort. Its
line-of-business report program would require some 440 of the largest man-
ufacturing corporations to report very detailed financial data annually, dis-
aggregated into standard industrial code (SIC) classifications. 6 While such a
data collection program may have been considered overwhelmingly expensive
in the past, the development of high-speed computers has made it relatively
inexpensive for a government agency to store and process large amounts of
data. Thus a past restraint on government data collection no longer exists.
But this is also a time when traditional beliefs are being questioned.
Perhaps it is no more ridiculous to ask whether more required financial dis-
closure is better than less than it is to ask whether a woman's place is always
in the home, or whether smoke pouring out of factory chimneys necessarily is
a sign of progress and prosperity.
I must emphasize at the outset that my concern is with required financial
disclosure. As I demonstrate below, corporations published financial state-
ments long before the SEC existed. We can presume that this disclosure met
the cost-benefit criterion, since it was made voluntarily. A corporation could
sell shares without disclosing much, and many did so; but others provided
information apparently because they believed that the benefits from, say, en-
hanced interest from investors exceeded the cost to them of preparing and
distributing the data and of having their competitors learn about their opera-
tions. Audits were conducted by C.P.A.'s, annual reports were voluntarily is-
sued, new developments were announced, and so forth before 1934. The
question at issue, then, is not whether disclosure as such is a good thing, but
whether the benefits of government-mandated disclosure exceed its costs and
5. See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF HOUSE COMM. ON IN-
TERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON SEC VOLUNTARY COM-
PLIANCE PROGRAM ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 1-15 (Comm. Print 1976).
6. See Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for 1975: Hearings Before
Subcomm. on Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
Part 9, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 601-51 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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which persons (e.g., consumers, investors, or government officials) obtain the
benefits and assume the costs. To keep the discussion within reasonable
bounds, I have limited this paper to the reporting requirements of the SEC
and the FTC. Each provides a good example of two aspects of government-
mandated disclosure.
I
THE COSTS OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE
A. The Direct Costs
1. SEC Reports
Not all of the costs of record keeping, auditing, and report preparation
are due to mandated disclosure. Corporations keep many records that aid in
the management of their enterprises. As was mentioned above, most larger pub-
licly owned corporations were audited by C.P.A.'s before the SEC in effect
imposed this requirement. 7 Furthermore, almost all corporations whose shares
were traded on stock exchanges (and hence, until 1964, -the only ones subject
to the periodic reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934) published annual financial statements.8 Therefore, the direct costs of
meeting the requirements imposed by laws and government agencies should
include only the expenses that otherwise would not have been incurred.
These additional expenses are considerable for several reasons. First, the
amount of detailed data required is considerably greater than corporations
would have recorded and reported voluntarily. SEC forms, for example, call
for information on compensating balances, detailed schedules of asset
amounts, accumulated depreciation and expense amounts, pension costs and
provisions, location of plants, and other data that probably would not have
been published otherwise. A recent example is the current requirement that
large companies report the replacement costs of their fixed assets. 9 Few, if
any, corporations have made those estimates. My conversations with a number
of comptrollers indicate that the cost of obtaining these data are considerable,
even under the SEC's proposed safe-harbor provision, which would limit the
liability of the companies for presenting estimates.
Second, some specific reports probably would not be prepared and dis-
7. In 1926, 82 per cent of the companies whose shares were traded on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) were audited by C.P.A.'s. By 1934 the percentage had increased to 94 per cent.
Benston, The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44 ACCOUNTING REV. 515, 519
(1969).
8. At least since 1926 all NYSE-traded corporations issued balance sheets and income state-
ments. Id.
9. SEC Accounting Series Release No. 190 (March 23, 1976), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
72,212; SEC Accounting Series Release No. 203 (Dec. 9, 1976), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
72,225.
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seminated were it not for the SEC's requirements. One example is audited
quarterly reports. While many companies voluntarily prepared quarterly re-
ports, it is doubtful that many would incur the expense of having them cer-
tified if the SEC did not require auditors to attest to these data in the annual
report. Another example is the requirement that annual reports be sent to
shareholders with proxy requests and that 10K reports be made available to
the public. Except for companies whose shares are listed on the major stock
exchanges, it also is doubtful that many firms would file monthly or more
frequent reports of changes in control, the acquisition or disposition of a sig-
nificant amount of assets, material legal proceedings, and so forth, as re-
quired in form 8K.
Therefore, the costs to companies not previously subject to the SEC's re-
porting requirements probably are not trivial. Unfortunately, I know of no
studies of the amount of these costs. One gets only occasional newspaper re-
ports of the additional costs incurred by companies newly subject to SEC reg-
ulations and of the effort by some smaller companies to reduce their number
of shareholders to free themselves from this burden. I have been unable to
verify these data.
In general, though, once a corporation has adapted its records to the
SEC's requirements, the additional direct cost of filling in the periodic report
forms may not be very great, though it may exceed the benefits thereof.
However, the relative burden on smaller corporations is most likely much
greater and may be quite onerous.
The direct cost of filing a registration statement (such as the S-I) for a
securities issue represents a burden that otherwise might not have been in-
curred, for several reasons. Companies contemplating their first security
issue must gather and record a wealth of data, such as detailed descriptions of
the business, its development during the past five years, and future activities
to be undertaken; information about the directors and promoters over the
past five years; audited and certified profit-and-loss, funds, and retained-
earnings statements for the past three years; and a summary of earnings for
the past five years with a textual analysis thereof. A consequence of these
requirements is that prospectuses usually run to fifty or more pages (measur-
ing 7 by 9 inches). In addition, when the SEC requires data that are not
recorded in a corporation's records, the cost of obtaining the numbers can be
considerable. One example is the requirement that companies going public
for the first time file three years' profit-and-loss statements certified by an
independent auditor, which means that at least three years' inventories have
to have been audited. Nonregistered companies which had not employed in-
dependent auditors over that time period for that purpose would suffer the
cost of delay. It is not sufficient that they simply disclose that past inventories
have not been audited.
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The SEC's regulations also require corporations to incur additional audit-
ing, reporting, and printing costs that are higher than for ordinary reporting.
An important determinant of these higher costs is the increased legal liability
of accountants and others for SEC reports. Independent auditors have been
sued successfully for audit failures and reporting errors. Furthermore, it is
not unusual for them to be sued when companies go bankrupt or suffer seri-
ous reverses.'" The cost to them of such suits is not only the monetary awards
imposed and the legal cost of defense, but the cost of damage to their reputa-
tions as honest, competent professionals. Hence they must take all suits seri-
ously, whether justified or not. Therefore, the independent auditors must
conduct a more extensive, more careful audit and check the effect of post-
audit, prefiling events when the figures are to be used in an SEC report. The
expense of these procedures obviously is reflected in higher audit fees.
Legal costs and printing fees are higher for SEC reports (particularly
new-issues filings) than for others because of legal liability, as just discussed.
In addition, since corporate managements and directors also are liable for
misstatements and errors in the reports, they cannot passively rely on their
hired experts. Therefore, an additional cost is the time and effort of man-
agement that could be otherwise employed. Since many, if not most, of these
costs do not vary with the dollar amount of the securities issue, the reporting
burden falls heavily on smaller companies that plan to raise less money with
an issue than their larger competitors do.
2. FTC's Line-of-Business Report Program
The direct costs of government-mandated disclosure such as the proposed
FTC line-of-business (LB) report may be even greater than the costs of re-
porting to the SEC. Unlike most of the SEC's required reports, the FTC's
reports are not consistent with the usual record keeping and reporting system
maintained by any business. Because the FTC wants to use the data to deter-
mine whether profits earned by industries (originally they were concerned
with markets) are "excessive" and to test hypotheses about the relationship of
market structure to performance, it requires corporations to aggregate their
data into predetermined categories. These categories follow industries defined
by standard industrial codes (SIC). For example, FTC category 3 1.02 consists
of SIC's 313 (footwear, except rubber) and 314 (boot and shoe cut stock and
findings); the category includes bindings, bows, buckles, heel lifts, laces, soles,
10. Robert Kellogg has found that investments in firms that are sued generally were earning
risk-adjusted negative returns before the suits and that discovery of actionable violations of the
federal Securities Acts appears to be associated with abnormally poor firm performance. R. Kel-
logg, An Empirical Study of Disclosure Error Civil Lawsuits Under the Federal Securities Laws
(dissertation in progress, University of Rochester).
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house slippers, men's, women's, infants', and babies' footwear, including dress,
casual, and work shoes, boots, and sandals." Revenues, the cost of operating
revenue, traceable and nontraceable media advertising, other selling expenses,
general administrative expenses, payrolls, depreciation, and assets must be re-
ported for each defined FTC (SIC) code. Unlike the SEC (and the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB)) line-of-business regulations, the FTC
regulations do not permit respondents to report these data according to the
product and production groups that the management ordinarily uses. Conse-
quently, the data processing costs can be very large.
The extent of these costs is in dispute, but we at least have some estimates.
In discussing the 1973 version of its current forms, the FTC said that twenty-
five companies estimated annual compliance costs that range from $5,000 to
$1,800,000, with a median value of $56,000.12 The FTC staff then used a
series of very questionable adjustments to reduce the estimated median cost of
complying with the newer, somewhat more simplified report form to $24,000
per company.1 3 The initial setup costs of the program were between $10,000
and $20,000 per firm, according to the FTC's submission to the GAO, which
is charged with approving the form. 4 These figures were based on data sub-
mitted by twenty-five companies for the earlier (1973) form. Their estimates
range from $75,000 to $2,000,000, with a mean value of $548,000. The FTC
reduced this amount to between $10,000 and $20,000 by another series of
questionable adjustments. Though a detailed analysis is not useful here (and
may be found elsewhere 5 ), it may be instructive to point out one particularly
dubious procedure followed by the FTC staff. To estimate the effect on costs
of reducing some reporting requirements, the staff telephoned six companies
and asked someone (not identified) to estimate the percentage by which the
company's previous estimate could be reduced if the requirements were
changed. The average percentage reduction in cost is reported to be eighty-
two per cent. This may seem to be a rather large reduction. In fact, examina-
11. Hearings, supra note 6, at 631; OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STANDARD INDUS-
TRIAL CLASSIFICATION MANUAL 133-34 (1972).
12. 1974 Form LB Revision 7. Bureau of Economics Staff Memorandum (July 1, 1975).
13. The questionable adjustments include the following: (1) use of a median value as a suffi-
cient statistic to describe a range of values between $50,000 and $1,800,000; (2) arbitrary reduc-
tion of the median value by a third; (3) conversion of costs to a cost per line of business when
there is no conceptual or empirical relationship between the number of lines and compliance
costs; and (4) multiplication of the computed cost per line of business by the estimated number of
lines of the average company (a number that was arbitrarily adjusted downward). A detailed
analysis of the procedures used may be found in G. Benston, The Cost of Complying with a
Government Data Collection Program: The FTC's Line-of-BLsiness Report (unpublished paper
on file with author, 1977).
14. Cost to Firms of LB Programs, Memorandum from Keith B. Anderson and William F.
Long, Economists, Federal Trade Commission, to James M. Folsom, Acting Director, Bureau of
Economics (May 8, 1974).
15. Benston, supra note 13.
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tion of the underlying data reveals that this average is computed from the
following percentage reductions of each of the six companies: 30, 73, 77, 86,
99, 99. Thus two companies are reported to have said that the proposed
changes would reduce their cost of compliance by ninety-nine per cent. It
does not seem reasonable (to me, at least) that they could produce the form
for only one per cent of their previous estimates because of some not very
extensive, or at least not radical, changes in the reporting requirements.
The most recent cost estimates submitted by the FTC are derived from a
telephone survey of some officials of 17 companies who had completed the
form. The 17 companies were chosen from among the 30 companies with
the largest number of manufacturing lines of business making sales of over
$10 million. In telephone conversations (apparently not detailed studies) con-
ducted in May and June 1977, the company officials estimated compliance
costs of between $2,100 and $100,000, with a mean amount of $28,640.
Many of the companies which would be required to submit line-of-business
data to the FTC dispute its estimates of the cost of compliance. Of the 440
companies served with demands to complete the forms, some 170 have filed
motions to quash. These noncomplying companies have brought suit in fed-
eral court to have the program discontinued. The deliberation in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia before Judge Thomas A.
Flannery in June 1977 was restricted to the costs of the program. Judge Flan-
nery requested that five corporations submit affidavits detailing the costs they
expected. Table I gives the costs listed in those affidavits.
These companies base their much higher estimates on the fact that their
present data recording and processing systems are not congruent with the
FTC's prescribed definitions of lines of business. Hence they would have to
record all of their basic data, rewrite computer programs, and restructure
reports to provide the data required by the FTC. Furthermore, they disagree
with the Commission's procedure of estimating compliance cost for a com-
pany on the assumption that there is a positive, reasonably meaningful rela-
tionship between the number of lines of business and compliance cost. In
addition to the fact that the available data show no such relationship (the
correlation is not significant), 16 the companies who are suing to stop the pro-
gram contend that the cost of compliance is due primarily to the amount of
divergence between a company's accounting system and the FTC's reporting
requirements. The affidavits filed give fairly detailed numbers and descrip-
tions of procedures in support of this contention and of estimates presented.
The FTC counters that the companies are refusing to take advantage of
the instructions that permit "well-informed estimates. ' 17 Rather, they say, the
16. See G. Benston, supra note 13.
17. Affidavit of William F. Long (director of the LB report program), and testimony at
evidentiary hearings before the Honorable Thomas A. Flannery, United States District judge.
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TABLE I
ESTIMATED COSTS OF COMPLIANCE
WITH THE FTC LINE-OF-BUSINESS REPORT PROGRAM
E.I. duPont de Nemours and Company :a
manual efforts to get data for 1974 and
1975/76 Form LB ....................
initial additional investment in new com-
puter programs .....................
annual costs thereafter ..................
Eaton Corporation:b
1974 report:
direct payroll costs (including fringe
benefi ts) ...........................
overhead ............................
following years (direct costs, no overhead)
Hobart Corporation:c
estimate made in 1975 (initial costs; current
costs should be higher) ...............
annual maintenance costs ................
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company:d
direct costs .............................
W.R. Grace and Company:e
estimate made in 1974 ...................
$ 1,000,000 to $1,500,000
1,000,000 to 1,500,000
100,000 to 200,000
401,811
100,452 502,263
286,843
1,000,000 to 3,000,000
500,000-plus
150,000
500,000
a Affidavit of Howard L. Siers, Assistant Comptroller, filed May 5, 1977.
b Affidavit of F.C. Roberts, Vice President and Controller, filed May 5, 1977.
Affidavit of Harland L. Mischler, Vice President and Controller, filed May 5, 1977.
d Affidavit of G.A. Sampson, Vice President and Controller, filed May 5, 1977.
e Affidavit of John F. Spellman, Vice President and Controller, filed May 5, 1977.
Source: In re FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 432 F. Supp. 274 (D.D.C. 1977).
companies insist on basing their reports on data that meet the requirements
of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Furthermore, the Com-
mission does not ask that the respondents restructure their data processing
systems. The companies can provide the demanded data, the Commission
claims, primarily by adjusting already existing reports to the requirements of
form LB.
However, the companies see themselves in an adversary relationship with
the FTC. This view is based on the fact that a primary purpose of the LB
report is the gathering of data that will be used to direct antitrust investiga-
tions. Though the Commission insists that individual company data will not be
used for this purpose, many companies do not believe they can rely on this
assurance, considering the FTC's adversary role. In addition, many companies
do not believe that the data they report will or can be kept confidential, since
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, June 17, 1977, in re FTC Line of
Business Report Litigation, Misc. No. 76-0127 (D.D.C. 1977).
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their file copies are subject to subpoena. Therefore, they may be revealing
data that will be useful to competitors or for private lawsuits. Consequently,
they cannot be casual or rely on well-informed estimates to report specific
numbers.
B. The Indirect Costs
The major indirect cost of government-mandated reports of accounting
data follows from the adversary nature of mandated disclosure. This is the
opportunity cost of having data reported that are correct with respect to the
regulations but misleading for the purposes of the report's user (type II
error). Another opportunity cost is incurred when data that would be useful
to users cannot be reported because the government regulations forbid this
reporting or because the risk of an adversary action is too great (type I error).
A possible example of the first (type II error) cost is the immediate
writeoff of goodwill that the SEC insisted on until recently.1 8 Another possible
example is the SEC's insistence (again, until recently) that only historically de-
termined numbers be used, which meant that assets could not be shown at
more than their original costs, even where the original costs were demonstra-
bly and significantly less than market values.19 (The qualifier "possible" is in-
serted because it is not known whether these reporting requirements actually
misled investors.) The FTC's insistence that companies aggregate their operat-
ing data into lines of business that do not reflect markets or other natural
groupings of products is another instance of the mandated reporting of po-
tentially misleading data. For example, the FTC may report a high profit rate
on sales or assets for the industry (or market) listed as "footwear, except rub-
ber; boot and shoe cut stock and findings .... " FTC code 31.02. Assuming
that the profit rate reported measures the economic rate of profit (which it
most likely does not), the high rate could be due to a very high rate on
women's dress shoes that offsets a low rate on men's dress shoes or women's
casual shoes, or a multitude of other combinations. If potential entrants to the
industry take the numbers seriously, they are very likely to make bad de-
cisions. Similarly, should a shoe manufacturer compare his or her financial
results to the numbers the FTC publishes, the manufacturer is likely to be
misled.
An example of the second (type I) cost is the SEC's prohibition on the
publication of "soft" data, such as the estimated value of natural resources,
18. "There was a period, for example, when the SEC was conducting something in the nature
of a campaign to eliminate goodwill from all balance sheets filed with it." L. RAPPAPORT, SEC
ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 7.10 (3d ed. 1972).
19. "I was on the SEC staff at the time [late 1930's], and involved in the decision, when after
some years of case-by-case decision, the SEC became firm on the point that historical cost was the
required basis of accounting." Kripke, A Search for Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy, 31 Bus.
LAW. 293, 295 (1975).
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patents, or land. ° Forecasts, for example, cannot be presented in prospec-
tuses. Until recently, the SEC's adherence to historical-cost-based numbers
discouraged, if not prohibited, the presentation of current-market- or price-
level-adjusted reports.
It is understandable that government-mandated reporting would result in
the agencies' requiring adherence to relatively rigid rules or in the respon-
dents' deciding to report only objectively determined data. The agencies have
to process a large amount of data. Generally it is not administratively feasible
for them to determine whether a company is "correct" (in some sense) when it
uses a subjectively derived estimate of value. Hence, the SEC prohibited the
use of appraised values for assets, particularly those appraisals of unmined
natural resources, such as coal, silver, and oil, that are difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to check. 2' Similarly, the value of intangibles often cannot be measured
accurately. Therefore, it is not surprising to find agencies such as the SEC
refusing to accept subjectively determined numbers. If they accept such num-
bers, they run the risk of permitting dishonest managements to publish delib-
erately misleading data, the cost of which will be borne by the government
agency as well as the public. However, where the agency only permits the
publication of objectively determined, though not useful, data, neither the
agency nor the companies filing the reports are likely to be criticized, particu-
larly when the procedures used have been endorsed by a respected profes-
sional body, such as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) or FASB. Only the public, if they are not fully aware of the data's
limitations, will bear the cost.
One consequence of the SEC's past insistence on conservative, historical-
cost-based numbers seems to be that some corporations avoid offering debt
securities to the public. From 1900 to 1934, only about three per cent of all
corporate debt securities were directly placed, but from 1935 to 1965 forty-six
per cent were directly placed. 22 While there no doubt are many reasons for
the change (such as the growth of life insurance companies who tend to invest
directly in corporate debt securities), it appears that a major factor was the
restrictions imposed by the SEC on information that could be publicized for
public security sales. I tested this hypothesis in the following manner. The
eight industries for which (since 1953) the SEC publishes data on private and
public debt issues were ranked by several professional accountants according
to the negative bias imposed by the SEC's accounting rules. (Agreement
20. See Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254-305
(1972). The prohibition is being reconsidered, see text accompanying note 4 supra.
21. See analysis of reasons for adverse decisions on accounting in registrations under the Se-
curities Act of 1933 in Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure Re-
quirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23, at 56-58. (H.
Manne ed. 1969).
22. A. COHAN, YIELDS ON CORPORATE DEBT DIRECTLY PLACED 1 (1967).
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among these professionals was complete.) Rankings then were made of the
ratio of debt directly placed to the total amount floated in each year 1953
through 1966 by each industry. Despite the fact that other institutional fac-
tors support direct debt placement by some industries (such as railroads) or
require the sale of securities by competitive bidding (as is the case with public
utilities), the rankings are almost perfectly correlated with direct debt
placement-the greater the bias imposed by the SEC, the greater the percen-
tage of debt directly placed. 23
The factors which motivate agencies such as the FTC to require reporting
of essentially useless or potentially misleading data are somewhat different
from those that motivate the risk-reducing actions of the SEC. An agency
such as the FTC wants information reported in predetermined, uniform
aggregates and categories to reduce the cost to them of analyzing data from
individual companies. Ease of data handling and mechanical analysis triumph
over meaningfulness and accuracy. The alternative probably would require a
very large staff that would exceed the FTC's budget and its ability to attract a
sufficient number of competent researchers. The consequence of this ad-
ministrative cost saving is the imposition of the cost of meaningless and poten-
tially misleading data on unwary or careless users.
Thus the direct costs of government-mandated financial reporting borne
by corporations (and hence by equity holders, consumers, and taxpayers) in-
clude the direct costs of recording, processing, auditing, printing, and report-
ing the data required. These costs are increased by corporate fear that the
data reported may be used to support lawsuits, antitrust litigation, and other
adversary actions against them. An additional consequence of this fear is the
reporting of data by procedures that are supported by authorities even when
the numbers are not reflective of the events they are supposed to reflect. The
agencies also tend to want data that are easy and safe to administer. Conse-
quently, the data reported are of limited value to those who would use them
as a basis for economic decisions.
Nevertheless, though their value is limited, the data may not be totally
useless. I turn, therefore, to a consideration of the benefits that might be
derived from the data reported to the SEC and the FTC.
II
THE BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT-MANDATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
A. SEC-Required Disclosure
The Federal Securities Acts were passed to correct presumed wrongs and
to improve the operations of the securities markets in particular and of the
23. Benston, supra note 21, at 67-75.
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economy in general. Seven benefits have been or might be claimed for the
corporate disclosure sections of the Acts.24 The first four pertain to the fair-
ness of securities investments. Though the concept of fairness is difficult to
define operationally, it seems clear that it is a strong reason for the passage
and extension of the Acts. The last three benefits are claimed in the belief
that the data which corporations could be required to disclose in financial
reports are useful for investment decisions. Consequently, the Acts are
thought to reduce the cost of investing and improve the allocation of re-
sources in the economy. The following seven benefits are delineated:
(1) Reduction of fraud on investors who might be misled by financial
statements that were intended to mislead them;
(2) Reduction or elimination of possibly inadvertent misrepresentation in
financial statements that affect investors' allocation of funds;
(3) Reduction or elimination of security price manipulation that is made
possible or enhanced by inadequate disclosure of financial informa-
tion;
(4) Enhanced fairness to noninsiders through the publication of informa-
tion that otherwise would be available only to insiders;
(5) Greater availability of information that otherwise would not be pub-
lished, not because managements or insiders would attempt to cheat
noninsiders but because the benefits of the information could not be
garnered fully by the shareholders of corporations, even though the
information would be beneficial to investors in general;
(6) Greater efficiency in making securities investments, as a result of the
publication of information that meets known and relatively unambig-
uous standards of accuracy, reliability, and meaning, that is pub-
lished in standard format, and that otherwise would not have been
available; and
(7) Enhanced public confidence in the securities market because the in-
formation disclosed can be trusted, while voluntarily supplied infor-
mation cannot.
Little, if any, evidence supports the belief that these possible benefits have
been achieved. Nor is there much, if any, evidence that is consistent with the
claim that the Acts addressed a real problem. Furthermore, reason does not
support the belief that the benefits claimed can be achieved or are indeed ben-
efits. Since I have analyzed these (and other) reasons for required disclosure
at some length in Corporate Financial Disclosure in the UK and the USA ,25 the
24. These benefits were delineated by me from readings and conversations. To be fair to the
proponents of SEC-required disclosure, I tried to err towards specifying more rather than fewer
benefits.
25. G. BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN THE UK AND THE USA (1976).
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following discussion is not as extensive as it could be. Chapter 4 of that book
can be consulted for the references that support the assertions made here.
The conceptual bases are discussed first, followed by a review of the evidence.
1. Conceptual Bases for SEC-Required Disclosure
a. Fraud, Manipulation, and Unfairness.
The first group of claims-prevention or reduction of fraud, misrepresen-
tation, and other manipulations or unfairness-are derived from two basic
assumptions. One is that the financial-statement data would be and can be
used to mislead investors; the other is that government regulation of financial
disclosure would be effective in preventing this misuse.
It is reasonable to believe that perpetrators of frauds would be willing to
use falsified or misleadingly presented financial data to effect their ends. It
also seems likely that promoters, managers, and insiders would prefer to hide
improprieties or inept performance by preventing disclosure of data that
would betray these activities. They also might want to delay or otherwise
manage the disclosure of good performance or fortunate occurrences until
they were able to secure shares in the enterprise at a less-than-equilibrium
price. Thus it seems clear that financial statements might be used in attempts
to defraud or mislead investors.
Whether financial statements would have the desired effect is another
question. Since it is obvious that improper financial statements may be used to
deceive, it also is obvious that investors will rather quickly become aware of
the dangers they face in relying on the statements. This is why certified public
accountants exist. They are independent experts whose stock-in-trade is an
integrity that is rarely compromised. Should they permit their certification of
financial statements to be purchased, they risk losing their most valuable
asset: their value to clients as certifiers of financial reports.2"
A second source of protection for the public is the reputation of the in-
vestment bankers who market securities. Their role was described well by Ar-
thur Dewing in the 1934 edition of his comprehensive work The Financial
Policy of Corporations : 7
Probably 99 out of 100 prospective investors in the securities of a new com-
pany have neither the training, inclination, nor the will to carry on any inde-
pendent investigation of their own, no matter how much information is put at
their disposal. In the last analysis, it is the authority of the investment banker
that inspires confidence in the new enterprise and not the investor's reliance
on his own powers of analysis. And the investor knows, moreover, that the
banker has spent far more time in investigating all the ramifications of the
26. For a more complete exposition see Benston, Accountants' Integrity and Financial Reporting,
43 FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE 10-14 (1975).
27. A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1018-19 (3d rev. ed. 1934).
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undertaking than he is likely to spend; and he knows that the banker's repu-
tation is bound up in the success or failure of the undertaking.
Thus there is reason to believe that the security underwriter's and public
accountant's reputations would afford investors protection from fraudulent or
misleading financial statements in the absence of government disclosure regu-
lations.
However, it can be argued that C.P.A.'s and investment bankers can be
compromised by those from whom they receive fees: being human, they may
succumb to greed. Government regulation may play a role in requiring the
publication of inside dealings and potential conflicts of interest, in ensuring
the independence of C.P.A.'s and investment bankers, and in prosecuting
those who violate their fiduciary responsibilities.
With respect to the question of fairness, it should be noted that in general,
it is not conceptually possible for government disclosure regulations to make
security investment fair for all in the sense that all investors have equal access
to all information. Even if corporations are required to announce everything
to the press, someone must obtain the information first. The chain of trans-
mission includes those who prepared the release, typed it, delivered it, read it
before setting it in type, read the galleys, and read the newspaper. Further-
more, some people are more capable of using information than others.
Therefore, as is discussed further below, a program of government-mandated
disclosure is perhaps more likely to be unfair to shareholders than not. Small
shareholders and investors in particular are not likely to benefit, since they
probably would not be early in the chain of receivers of the information or
have the ability or resources to exploit it efficiently. Whether outright fraud
and misrepresentation were a serious problem before passage of the Securities
Acts and whether the SEC has eliminated or at least reduced such occur-
rences are empirical questions that are discussed below.
b. Efficiency of Investment and Allocation of Resources.
The second group of claims for the benefits of mandated disclosure
-improved efficiency of investment and allocation of resources-are derived
from the assumption that published financial information is useful for in-
vestment decisionmaking. In the case of government-mandated disclosure,
this assumption has the following corollaries: (1) the specific disclosures that
companies would tend to withhold and the government would require them
to disclose are useful; (2) the government (or its delegates, e.g., the FASB)
can know which financial numbers are relevant to investment decisions; (3)
the disclosures can be sufficiently timely to be of value to the investor.
With respect to the first corollary, it is argued that companies suppress
useful information about their operations solely because they cannot restrict
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this information to their shareholders. To understand this argument-and its
errors-it is important to note that more information is not always better if it
requires resources to produce, distribute, and use. As is true of all goods,
there is an optimal quantity that is determined by the cost of the information
and its value: the optimal quantity is that amount for which the marginal cost
is no greater than the marginal value. Information will be produced by cor-
porations when they have a comparative advantage, when the costs to them
are less than the costs to others, ceteris paribus.
If corporations could give their shareholders an exclusive property right
in information, they would produce all information which costs the sharehold-
ers no more than it benefits them. 28 This information may even include data
about other corporations that would benefit other investors, since the share-
holders could sell any information they did not use themselves. In fact, simi-
lar reasoning holds in the absence of an exclusive property right in informa-
tion so long as the shareholders' access to the information is superior to
others'. In this situation, the price of the shares will reflect the value to inves-
tors of receiving information about the corporation, since receipt of this in-
formation will save investors the cost of obtaining it otherwise; hence the
shares will be more valuable by the amount saved. The information will still
repay the shareholders for the expenses it occasioned on their account, even
though their right in it is not absolute.
Nevertheless, the impossibility of granting shareholders an exclusive prop-
erty right in information does have one effect on the information economy.
Corporations who act in their shareholders' interest will not produce and pub-
lish information that on balance will benefit other investors at shareholders'
expense. Corollary (1) above is based on the argument that this information,
which would be withheld in the absence of disclosure requirements, would be
of general value if disclosed. But let us see what the value of that information
would be.
A requirement that this information be published will harm shareholders,
not only by the advantage that the information affords other investors, but
also by imposing the cost of the information on shareholders. Sharehold-
ers might benefit from required disclosure if there were sufficiently large
economies of scale in the production and use of information that are not
specific to individual corporations. In this event, the required disclosure by all
corporations would provide information that, in total, is of greater value than
its cost of production. All investors would benefit, and it is possible that the
benefits accruing to the shareholders from information published by other
companies would exceed the costs they bear of publishing the informa-
28. For a complete analysis, see F. Milne and R. Watts, Corporate Information: A Public or a
Private Good (August 1977) (unpublished manuscript, University of Rochester).
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tion about their own. If sufficient economies of scale do not exist, however,
the disclosure requirement will harm shareholders and benefit only other in-
vestors.
One counterargument to this is that information is a public good in the
sense that its consumption by one person does not reduce its value to another.
(Another example is the receipt of a television signal.) But this is true only
when prices are in equilibrium. Gonedes, Dopuch, and Penman, for example,
say that if the information 29
provides a completely reliable signal pertaining to the true value of an asset's
relative risk . .. [it can be used to assess] the equilibrium return on the asset.
But the same signal can be used by any other agent who wishes to assess the
equilibrium expected return on the asset.
When a share price is out of equilibrium, one person's use of information
drives the price towards equilibrium, thereby reducing and ultimately elim-
inating the value of the information. Hence required disclosure would bene-
fit some persons at the expense of others in this respect as well.
Another argument for the value of required disclosure is that the informa-
tion disclosed is less costly for investors to use than are voluntarily disclosed
numbers. One reason is that the numbers are produced under standards that
are known to users. Another reason is that the data are presented in standard
formats and are centrally available. This reasoning, however, leads to some
questions. What reason is there to believe that C.P.A.-audited data are not
reliable and that data produced pursuant to the SEC's historical-cost bias and
standards determined by the regulatory rather than the market process are
likely to be more useful to investors? And why is it a government function to
standardize data or require that corporations produce standardized data?
Finally, the value of disclosed information is affected by the physical prob-
lem of transmission described in the previous section. Some shareholders or
investors-whoever gets the information first-will trade on it, to the possible
detriment of someone who has not yet received it.
Thus if required financial disclosure is useful, it is useful (a) to the inves-
tors who receive the information first; (b) only to investors who are not share-
holders, unless there are sufficiently great economies of scale in producing
the information; or (c) only when the price is out of equilibrium, and then
only to some investors. Aside from questions of equity, a determination of
whether society as a whole benefits depends on whether the total cost of re-
quired disclosure exceeds the total benefits. This determination depends, in
part, on whether required disclosure is likely to produce information or sim-
ply data, a distinction discussed below.
This brings us to the second corollary listed above, which states that the
29. Gonedes, Dopuch, & Penman, Disclosure Rules, Infornation-Production and Capital Market
Equilibrium: The Case of Forecast Disclosure Rules, 15 J. AccoUNTING RESEARCH 89, 96 (1976).
[Vol. 4 1: No. 3
DISCLOSURE COSTS AND BENEFITS
government (or its delegates) can know which information is relevant to fi-
nancial decisions. The theory on which this proposition is based is not as well
articulated as one would like. A reasonably good stock-valuation model has
yet to be constructed. Economists, accountants, analysts, and others differ
considerably on specifically what information is useful for investment deci-
sions. While most people would accept the definition of assets and liabilities as
the present value of expected cash flows, it is generally recognized that de-
termination of the relevant cash flows and discount rates is essentially subjec-
tive and perhaps impossible. The arguments revolve around which variables
and which models are the best proxies for the desired numbers. Therefore, it
is questionable whether the employees of the SEC are more likely to deter-
mine the relevant data that should be disclosed than are others, particularly
those who are investing their own resources. (In this regard, it is useful to
note that the SEC has almost consistently opposed cash flow accounting, even
though it is consistent with the present-value model, assuming that past cash
flows are useful for estimating future cash flows.) 30
Finally, let us consider the third corollary listed above: If the numbers
produced are not distributed to investors with sufficient dispatch, their in-
formation content may be learned from other sources. Hence the numbers
disclosed will be data, not information, since their receipt will not affect
people's expectations. While this essentially is an unresolved empirical ques-
tion, it seems clear that numbers produced pursuant to government regula-
tions that make the issuer liable to penalties should the reports violate the
regulations are likely to be less timely than numbers produced voluntarily. In
fact, the SEC has consistently opted for accuracy and conformance with regu-
lations over speed of transmission, particularly with respect to security regis-
tration statements.
Though, in my opinion, the weight of the theory does not support the
belief that required disclosure is likely to result in benefits gross of costs, the
empirical evidence should be considered. The evidence relevant to each of the
seven presumed benefits is discussed in turn.
2. The Evidence on SEC-Required Disclosure
a. Fraud in Financial Statements
There is almost no evidence to support the assertion that the financial
statements of publicly traded companies were fraudulently or misleadingly
prepared in the years prior to the passage of the Securities Acts.3" The U.S.
Senate hearings that preceded passage of the 1934 Act cite only a few in-
30. SEC Accounting Series Rel. No. 142 (Mar. 15, 1973), 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 72,164.
31. See G. BENSTON, supra note 25, § 4.2.2 for references.
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stances of fraudulent financial statements. 32 There were very few cases before
1934 that charged accountants or companies with fraudulent or grossly neg-
ligent financial statements. 3  This lack of cases, however, may have been due
to the difficulty of suing certified public accountants because of the prevailing
rule of privity. This rule maintained that only the person for whom the
statements were directly prepared (usually the company) could sue, unless the
auditor had made a reckless misstatement or insincere expression of opinion.
The Securities Acts altered that situation, making it incumbent on the accoun-
tant to demonstrate that he was free from negligence or fraud inasmuch as,
after reasonable investigation, he believed the statements certified were true.
Nevertheless, there were few actions against accountants until the 1960's,
which is consistent with the belief that there was no pent-up desire to sue
public accountants that was suppressed by the difficulty of maintaining a suit.
There is evidence that many prospectuses contained little financial data
before passage of the Securities Act of 1933. Though I do not know of a
study of the facts, the literature is replete with assertions to this effect.34
Other than self-evidently outrageous puffery that implied a promise of great
wealth, I know of no evidence of fraudulent financial data in prospectuses. It
seems likely, however, that some fraud must have occurred.
However, it also is clear that fraud in financial statements has not been
eliminated as a consequence of the Securities Acts. Indeed, such instances as
Equity Funding,35 Homestake Investment,36 Yale Express,37 H. L. Green,38 and Na-
tional Student Marketing3 9 eclipse the cases of the pre-SEC period. From cur-
rent evidence, it almost seems as if it is now easier to defraud some investors,
possibly because the existence of the SEC lulls them into believing that fraud
is a problem of the past.
b. Misrepresentation in Financial Statements
Misrepresentation-reporting the results of income and operations, assets
and liabilities, so as to hide or obscure bad performance or give the illusion of
good performance-is thought by many to be a more serious problem than
fraud. The misrepresentation may be accomplished by choosing among alter-
native acceptable accounting procedures (e.g., using the pooling rather than
32. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
33. See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
34. See, e.g.. Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of Securities Markets, in ECONOMIC
POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES (H. Manne ed. 1969).
35. In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
36. Geo. H. McFadden & Bros. v. Home-Stake Production Co., 295 F. Supp. 587 (N.D. Okla.
1968).
37. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
38. H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
39. SEC v. Nat'l Student Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975).
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purchase method to account for an acquisition), by changing accounting
methods (e.g., shifting from first-in-first-out (FIFO) to last-in-first-out (LIFO)
inventory accounting), by recording revenue or expenses when convenient
(e.g., choosing which asset to sell when similar assets were recorded at differ-
ent historical costs or capitalizing rather than expensing research and de-
velopment costs), or by deciding which figure to report as earnings per share
(e.g., charging extraordinary expenses to retained earnings or not clearly dis-
closing the number of common shares that might be issued pursuant to op-
tions). Government control over the alternatives that can be used by a corpo-
ration for reporting its financial situation is said to be a means of reducing
the extent to which such manipulations can occur.
First, the available evidence does not support the claim that manipulations
of reported accounting data are successful in fooling investors. 40 Numerous
studies have been conducted that attempt to measure the effect on stock
prices of changes in earnings per share that result from changes in account-
ing procedures. Among the changes studied are shifts from FIFO to LIFO
inventory accounting, from accelerated to straight-line depreciation, from
statutory to GAAP-determined earnings of life insurance companies, and
from historical to price-level-adjusted earnings. Other studies have measured
the effect on share price of one method of accounting rather than another.
These studies include flow-through versus deferral accounting for income
taxes where tax and book depreciation differ, pooling versus purchase ac-
counting for acquisitions, and full-cost versus writeoff accounting of oil and
gas exploration costs. The findings of these studies are not consistent with the
belief that share prices are affected by differences in accounting procedures
alone. Hence, while a requirement that one method or another be used by
most companies in an industry might result in less criticism of regulators and
accountants, the evidence indicates that it would not benefit investors.
To the contrary, if published accounting statements provide investors with
information, a movement towards uniform accounting is likely to reduce the
value of that information. This would occur when a particular accounting
procedure that provides a meaningful measurement for one firm produces a
misleading measurement for another. For example, whether straight-line or
accelerated depreciation describes the decline in present value of an asset
depends on the pattern of its expected net cash flows. Another example is the
requirement that research and development expenses be written off. The cor-
rectness of this procedure depends on the expected economic life of the re-
search output. Since regulatory agencies (and accountants fearful of lawsuits)
prefer to minimize risk and criticism should the future turn out to be worse
than expected, they tend to require conservative, uniform procedures that are
likely to result in the publication of misleading financial statements.
40. See G. BENSTON, supra note 25, § 4.2.3 for citations.
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c. Security Price Manipulation
It is alleged by the SEC that security price manipulation in the late 1920's
and early 1930's4"
resulted in a situation in which no one could be sure that market prices for
securities bore any reasonable relation to intrinsic values or reflected the im-
personal forces of supply and demand . . . . One of the principal contribut-
ing factors to the success of the manipulator was the inability of investors and
their advisors to obtain reliable financial and other information upon which to
evaluate securities.
The SEC refers to the manipulation of the shares of over one hundred com-
panies listed on the New York Stock Exchange. I obtained the names of these
companies.4 2 All had financial statements published in Moody's Investors Service
for at least two years before their securities were allegedly manipulated. All
provided investors with balance sheets and income statements that were au-
dited by C.P.A.'s. The only major items not reported were sales and cost of
goods sold. However, the percentage of companies which did not publish
these data (in 1929, for example, thirty-nine per cent did not reveal sales and
fifty per cent did not disclose cost of goods sold) was smaller in this group
than among other NYSE-listed companies whose stock presumably was not
manipulated. Thus periodic financial disclosure seems to have had little to do
with stock price manipulation.
d. Fairness to Noninsiders
An operational definition of fairness to a noninsider might be that when
he purchases or sells shares, the price paid or received should impound all of
the information known to insiders about the company. Thus the price would
reflect the intrinsic value of the company, in the sense that while it might not
be correct in the light of subsequent events, the probability that this error will
be in the investor's favor is equal to the probability that it will be to his loss.
Thus the market would be a fair game for the noninside investor.
Of course it is not possible to measure whether the market price of shares
reflects all the information that anyone knows about a corporation. In addi-
tion, it is not physically possible for all investors to receive all information
simultaneously and evaluate it with equal effectiveness. However, it has been
shown that if all known information were impounded in share prices, succes-
sive price changes would be independent, appearing to follow a random
41. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A 25-YEAR SUMMARY OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION xi-xvi (1959).
42. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 136 (Mar. 1973). See also Friend & Westerfield, Required Disclo-
sure and the Stock Market: Comment, 65 AM. EcON. REV. 467 (1975); Benston, Required Disclosure and
the Stock Market: Rejoinder, 65 AM. EcoN. REV. 473 (1973).
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walk.4 3 Thus one can measure fairness by the statistical properties of past
share prices; for if the changes were independent, the data would be consis-
tent with the hypothesis that the market was a fair game. (However, this test
would not prove the hypothesis.)
Numerous studies of United States share price behavior have been con-
ducted with share price data before and after passage of the Securities Acts,
with prices of shares traded on registered exchanges and over the counter,
and with daily, weekly, and monthly changes. European stock market data
have also been studied. Almost all of these studies report that share price
changes are independently distributed. These data indicate, at least, that the
Securities Acts have had no measurable effect on the independence of succes-
sive share price changes, and that the market was and is in this sense a fair
game without this type of legislation.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that there is and was some unfair trading by
insiders. Someone must get information before someone else, and the first
person is likely to attempt to benefit from his knowledge. However, there is
no evidence of which I am aware that shows that the extent of fairness to
noninsiders was a serious problem before the Securities Acts were enacted or
is any different as a consequence of the financial-disclosure provisions of the
legislation.
e. Availability of Information That Otherwise Would Not Be Published
A primary benefit that the Securities Acts are presumed to achieve is the
availability to investors of information that enables them to make informed
decisions. Granting that information is beneficial for investment decisions, the
efficacy of SEC-required disclosure (gross of costs) is based on the following
assumptions, as stated in the discussion of the concepts involved: that the
information produced would not have been otherwise forthcoming, and that
it is indeed information.
There is some empirical evidence that speaks to the assumptions. First, as
is indicated above, a considerable amount of financial data were published
before passage of the Securities Acts. Most corporations whose shares were
traded on the major exchanges produced the standard audited financial
statements.44 Though it is said that prospectuses accompanying new securities
issues did not provide much information, no study of the extent or adequacy
of the information presented has been made, to my knowledge.
Second, there is evidence that the numbers produced pursuant to the
SEC's regulations are not information. The major financial item that was not
disclosed by a significant number of corporations prior to passage of the 1934
43. See G. BENSTON, supra note 25, § 4.2.5 for citation to works referred to in this section.
44. See id. § 4.2.6 for citations to works referred to but not footnoted in this section.
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Act is sales. Thirty-eight per cent of the NYSE-listed corporations did not
disclose this number. A statistical test of the meaningfulness of the required
disclosure of sales was made by analyzing the behavior of share prices of the
corporations that formally disclosed this number for the first time.4 5 I
hypothesized that if the required disclosure of sales provided investors with
information, the share prices of the affected corporations would differ sig-
nificantly from the predisclosure magnitudes and variances, with other factors
that affect share prices accounted for. The share price behavior of other cor-
porations (sixty-two per cent) that had disclosed sales before 1934 served as a
control sample. The statistics showed no significant difference between the
pre- and post-SEC period or between the samples that did and did not dis-
close sales prior to the SEC disclosure requirement. Thus investors appear
either to have learned about sales from other sources or to have found the
numbers of no measurable (or at least measured) value.
Another test of the market's reaction to SEC-mandated disclosure was
conducted by Daniel W. Collins, who was concerned with the post-1970 SEC
requirement that corporations publish data by product line. 46 Since the SEC
required that these data be published for prior years, Collins was able to cal-
culate the value of the retrospective data had they been available to investors.
For this purpose, he developed and tested share pricing strategies that de-
pend on knowledge of product-line data and compared these to strategies
using consolidated data only. Collins found that investors would have made
significantly greater returns before commissions, etc., in 1968 and 1969 but
not in 1970 had they had this information. Horwitz and Kolodny also ex-
amined the usefulness of required product-line disclosure by examining its
effect on the share prices and market measures-of-risk of companies who re-
ported segment-income data for the first time in 1971, using a sample of
companies that did not as a control. They conclude, "[Our] results provide no
evidence in support of the universally accepted contention that the SEC re-
quired disclosure furnished investors with valuable information.""
Finally, there is evidence that by the time financial reports are released to
the public, their information content is known. Numerous studies have shown
that the publication of annual statements is not accompanied by significant
share price changes, which indicates that the data contained therein were
known and previously discounted, that the statements do not contain informa-
tion, or that the research was faulty. 41 Since other research indicates a greater
volume of trading in the period when earnings results are announced, it
45. Benston, supra note 42.
46. Collins, SEC Product-Line Reporting and Market Efficiency, 2 J. FINANCIAL ECON. 125 (1975).
47. Horwitz and Kolodny, Line of Business Reporting and Security Prices: An Analysis of an SEC
Disclosure Rule, 8 BELL J. OF EcON. 234, 237 (1977).
48. See G. BENSTON, supra note 25, § 4.2.6 for references.
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would seem that the financial statements are not totally ignored.49 This
somewhat conflicting finding was replicated in a recent, as yet unpublished
study that speaks directly to the question of the effect of SEC-mandated dis-
closure. Paul Griffin studied the impact of 1975-76 sensitive-foreign-
payments disclosures. 50 He found a significant increase in transactions in the
weeks before and after foreign-payments disclosure. The value of the corpo-
rations' shares, though, showed but a small temporary decline: prices reverted
to their normal levels within two weeks.
f. Efficiency in Security Investment and in the Allocation of Resources
There is little direct evidence on the effect of required disclosure on the
efficiency with which securities markets operate. I do not know of any mea-
surements of the cost of securities analysis and choice that permits a compari-
son of the pre- and post-SEC periods. Nevertheless, it is generally believed
that the SEC's prospectus regulations result in considerably higher costs than
had previously been incurred. Not only are auditing, legal, and printing costs
higher, but also the delay that underwriters and corporations must endure
while waiting for clearance by the SEC can be very costly. It may be that
investors benefit from these expenditures by getting better information that
enables them to make more effective decisions. However, even friendly critics
of the SEC demur; for example, Homer Kripke says: 51
I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the Securities Act of 1933 is not
operating as it should and that the prospectus has become a routine, mean-
ingless document which does not serve its purpose. Trying to keep from
going entirely academic on the ivory shelf by maintaining my contacts with
the practicing bar, I have reached the conclusion that most lawyers agree with
me, and think of the registration process as simply a useless, but lucrative bit
of paperwork.
It would seem that the costs outweigh the benefits.
Indirect evidence also may be brought to bear on this question. First, as
discussed above, the findings that share price changes were independently
distributed before the Securities Acts and in countries that do not regulate
disclosure as does the United States are consistent with the hypothesis that
government-mandated disclosure is irrelevant to the efficient impounding of
information within share prices. Other evidence on the immediate effect of
SEC-mandated disclosure is also generally consistent with this conclusion. Sec-
ond, the specific financial information currently published by such financial
services as Moody's Manuals and Standard and Poors has changed very little
49. Id.
50. P. Griffin, Disclosure Policy and the Securities Market: The Impact of the 1975-76 Sensi-
tive Foreign Payment Disclosures (November 1976) (unpublished manuscript, Stanford Univer-
sity, Graduate School of Business).
51. Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAw. 631 (1973).
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from that published before 1934. If investors wanted the data that are made
available in the 10K's, one would expect these services to provide them. Also,
few shareholders have requested 10K's, even when they have been offered at
no charge. 5
It is difficult to determine whether the Securities Acts have enhanced or
hindered the efficient allocation of resources in the economy. I do not believe
that a detailed study is required to show that investors still make investment
decisions that turn out to be disastrous. Sudden and long-run stock market
declines have characterized the post-SEC period as least as much as the pre-
SEC years. If anything, it would appear that the higher costs of floating new
securities, particularly for small companies, may have hindered the efficient
allocation of resources in the economy. Even if some shareholders have been
saved from making bad investments, others have been prevented from mak-
ing good ones.
g. Public Confidence in the Securities Market
The evidence on this presumed benefit also is mostly indirect. The amount
of new securities issues in proportion to capital formation was much lower
after the Securities Acts were enacted than before. 53 The use of private
placements instead of public sales of securities also increased dramatically
after 1933. The post-SEC period is also characterized by the growing impor-
tance of mutual funds and other institutional investors. This evidence is in-
consistent with the belief that the Securities Acts enhanced public confidence
in the securities markets.
Additionally, it is not clear why greater individual investment in equity
securities is a good thing. As recent experience once more shows, equity in-
vestments entail risk. Many people might be better advised to invest their
savings through financial intermediaries. Why, then, is it a government func-
tion to support a particular form of saving?
B. The FTC's Line-of-Business Report Program 4
The FTC claims that the data collected pursuant to its LB program will
yield benefits to government, economists, business, labor, investors, and con-
sumers. The specific benefits expected are said to include the following,
gleaned from the statements of purpose produced by the FTC:55
52. Shareholders Exhibit Lack of Interest in 10-K Data, 138 J. ACCOUNTANCY 21 (Nov. 1974).
53. See G. BENSTON, supra note 25, § 4.2.8 for citations to works referred to.
54. For a more detailed analysis see Benston, The Federal Trade Commission's Line of Business
Program: A Benefit-Cost Analysis, in GOVERNMENT INFORMATIONAL NEEDS AND BUSINESS DISCLO-
SURE (H. Goldschmid ed. in press 1978).
55. These are from the FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANNUAL LINE OF BUSINESS REPORT
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE (1973); BUREAU OF ECONOMICS STAFF REPORT, FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION LINE OF BUSINESS REPORTING PROGRAM (1974); and FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
SUPPORTING STATEMENT, FTC FORM LB 1974 SURVEY VERSION (1975).
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(1) The government's antitrust enforcement activities will be more effi-
cient, since the LB rate-of-profit and other data will provide im-
proved guides for investigations.
(2) Macroeconomic policy will be supported by the improved quality of
data used in the government's efforts to control inflation and unem-
ployment.
(3) Resources will be allocated more efficiently because investors will get
data that will point out the industries in which demand is inade-
quately satisfied and, as a consequence, profits will be particularly
high. Stock analysts and investors will also learn more about the per-
formance of individual corporations; this will in turn force managers
to use the resources at their command more efficiently.
(4) Economic studies of industry performance will be improved consider-
ably, particularly those that seek to measure the interrelationship
among market structure, research and development costs, marketing
expenditures, and profits.
(5) Business will benefit by having data that can be used to evaluate per-
formance and pinpoint new opportunities at low cost. Buyers will be
able to use the LB data to form judgments concerning the appro-
priateness of price/cost margins and profit rates.
(6) Labor will benefit because the LB data will facilitate comparisons
among industries of labor's share of the pie.
(7) Investment analysts and investors will be able to use the LB reports to
evaluate the prospects for particular industries.
(8) Consumers will benefit from the improvement in the markets for
goods, services, and capital.
These expectations are based on three key assumptions. First, the LB
categories defined by the FTC are presumed to be meaningful aggregates for
the purposes delineated above. Second, the data collected are presumed to
provide economically meaningful measures of profits per dollar of sales and
assets. The third assumption, similar to the SEC's, is that the data that would
be collected are not otherwise available to the market. Since the FTC, at the
suggestion of the court of appeals, has postponed the compliance deadline at
least until March 1, 1978, (to give the court time to consider the case), the
analysis must be limited to a consideration of the conceptual basis for the
program. 56 However, in this instance this analysis should be sufficient.
1. LB Categories and the Definition of Markets
Most of the benefits claimed for the LB report program depend on the
data's being aggregated into meaningfully defined markets. For example, the
56. In re FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 432 F. Supp. 274 (D.D.C. 1977).
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antitrust laws refer to illegal collusion among producers of a specific product
or group of products. Investment decisions similarly require data on
markets-groups of products that are substitutes in use. Economic studies
and, to some extent, macroeconomics intelligence may use industry rather
than market data for some purposes, but the industries defined should in-
clude only goods that are substitutes in production. Furthermore, for the data
to be useful for purchasing agents, labor leaders, or businesspersons, the
numbers should relate to the specific products with which they are concerned.
If the LB categories are broad aggregates of products, potential users will not
be able to determine the source of a high or low rate of return.
When one examines the FTC-defined categories which are based on stan-
dard industrial codes, it is clear that the aggregates cannot be useful for any
of the purposes delineated. First, the SIC categories were designed primarily
to reflect production rather than consumption groupings. Thus copper roof
gutters are in one category and plastic gutters are in another. That is why
Betty Bock, Director of Antitrust Research for the Conference Board, says:
"[A] Oletailed analysis of the LB categories made up of single 4-digit SIC
codes would be likely to show that few, if any, could be directly correlated
with markets whose boundaries are not open to serious debate. '5 7 Since half
of the FTC's codes are even broader (being aggregates of SIC four-digit
codes), she concludes: 58
I have come to believe that published data for the LB categories could cause
the Commission and all other users to make errors so serious that, if the
Commission were to proceed with the program, such users would be well
advised to behave as if the data did not exist.
Second, the categories are too broad to be useful for most of the de-
lineated purposes. For example, consider one of the more meaningful
categories, FTC code 20.07, frozen specialties. Say an antitrust agency official
believes that the market for frozen waffles is monopolized, or a potential
manufacturer considers entering the field, or an investor or manager wants to
compare the performance of his company with the industry. How can the
relevant information be determined when FTC code 20.07 includes data from
other frozen products such as baked foods, dinners, pies, pizza, soups, and
spaghetti and meat balls? A high (or low) rate of profit for FTC code 20.07
may be due to a high (or low) rate on some of these products combined with
a low (or high) profit rate on frozen waffles.
Third, the FTC categories, defined as they are, are contaminated. Because
corporations do not keep their records according to FTC codes, they must
group the data. To reduce somewhat the otherwise very high reporting bur-
57. Affidavit of Betty Bock with Respect to Proposed 1974 FTC Form LB Before Federal
Trade Commission, Statement in Behalf of Aluminum Co. of America, et al. 8 (May 15, 1975).
58. Id. at 9-10.
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den, the FTC permits respondents to combine data derived from given cost
or profit centers (or other established units) that belong in different FTC
codes, and report all the numbers as if they were due to a single FTC code
if revenue properly belonging to that code is at least 85 per cent of the
total. The costs related to the buried FTC codes can be any percentage of the
total. An analysis by Dr. Bock indicates that over one-quarter of the FTC
categories are likely to be contaminated with respect to revenues (overstated,
understated, or both) by more than 15 per cent, and almost half by more
than 10 per cent. 5S No one (including the FTC) will be able to estimate the
degree of cost contamination from the data reported. In addition, FTC rules
that permit vertically integrated companies to combine data from several FTC
codes additionally contaminate the reported categories and eliminate report-
ing of the categories thus combined. Therefore, even if the FTC defines
meaningful aggregates, the data reported would not reflect what they purport
to reflect.
2. The Meaningfulness of LB Data
Assuming that an FTC line-of-business category represents some meaning-
ful aggregation of data, such as a market, we must next consider whether the
data reported represent meaningful measures of profits and rates of return.
Most of the benefits expected from the program depend on these measure-
ments. Unfortunately, it is doubtful that this requirement is met because of
unsolved and essentially unsolvable problems of intracompany transfers, allo-
cations of common and joint expenses and assets, and the general lack of
coherence between accounting numbers and economic values.
a. Intracompany Transfers
Intracompany transfers are a problem because many, perhaps most, com-
panies do not price them at market prices. For a variety of reasons (control,
nonavailability of data, cost-center rather than profit-center organization,
tradition, etc.) they use other values, such as actual or standard direct or total
cost, and negotiated prices. The FTC recognizes the effect of these practices
in its 1973 Statement of Purpose, as follows: "Given the needs of the FTC, it
appears that the use of market prices is appropriate. The use of any alterna-
tive procedure would distort the measurement of relative profitability."6
They illustrate how a 10 per cent difference between market and nonmarket
transfer prices can distort a rate of return on sales or assets by 21 to 30 per
cent. Nevertheless, the FTC permits companies to use whatever method they
59. Bock, Line of Business Reporting: A Quest for a Snark?, 12 CONFERENCE BOARD REC. 10, 18
(Nov. 1975).
60. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ANNUAL LINE OF BUSINESS REPORT PROGRAM, STATEMENT OF
PURPOSE 11 (1973).
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choose when reporting transfer prices, because they learned that the com-
panies could convert their data to market prices only at a very high cost, if at
all. Thus the reported data will be distorted by unknown amounts.
b. Allocations of Joint and Common Cost
Even more of a problem than transfers, these allocations are particularly
troublesome for the corporations that are the subjects of the FTC's program,
since an important reason for the existence of multiproduct companies is the
efficiency of joint and common production and distribution. That is why mul-
tiproduct companies are not just simple aggregates of single-product com-
panies, as are mutual funds or holding companies. Many (perhaps most)
companies do not allocate to operating divisions such expenses as central of-
fice operation, research and development, and marketing and warehousing.
Many more do not allocate divisional expenses to product lines (as the com-
panies define them) or to products. The procedures for making many of
these allocations are necessarily arbitrary, since there is no conceptually cor-
rect way to allocate a cost to an individual activity if the cost is jointly deter-
mined by several activities. Where costs are common to several activities, there
usually is no practical way to determine the amounts that would have resulted
had only one of the activities been undertaken. Without this knowledge, allo-
cations are not useful for most economic decisions and are likely to provide
misleading data. The problem is particularly serious for the FTC line-of-
business report, because almost no company is organized according to the
FTC's line-of-business categories. Hence the amount of expenses and assets
that must be allocated arbitrarily can be considerable.
The FTC recognizes the problem but nevertheless insists that all expenses
(other than interest and income taxes) and all assets be assigned and allocated
to one or another designated line of business. The magnitude of the distor-
tions due to arbitrary allocations can be estimated from data presented in a
study by Mautz and Skousen.6 1 In their survey of 255 companies, they find
the average ratio of noninventoried common costs to sales is .078, while the
average ratio of net income to sales is .063. Thus differences in allocating
these costs can have a considerable effect on reported net profits. The mag-
nitudes of these effects can be determined from Mautz and Skousen's analysis
of the effect of alternative acceptable methods of allocating common costs on
the product-line net profits of 6 companies. A comparison of the net prof-
its per line that a company would report by using its preferred method (des-
ignated P*) compared to the net profits it would report using an alternative
(designated P) was made by expressing PIP* in percentage terms. This cal-
61. Mautz and Skousen, Common Cost Allocation in Diversified Companies, 36 FINANCIAL EXECU-
TIVE 15-17, 19-25 (June 1968).
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culation was made for a total of 30 lines of business on which the 6 companies
reported. In one case, the alternative method reported net profits that were
only 3 per cent of the profits reported by the preferred method; in another,
the alternative yielded 843 per cent of the preferred-method profits. Be-
tween those two extremes, the other ratios were scattered as follows: 2 others
fell below 5 per cent, 4 fell between 6 per cent and 10 per cent, 9 between
11 per cent and 20 per cent, 4 between 21 per cent and 40 per cent, 2 be-
tween 41 per cent and 60 per cent, 1 between 61 per cent and 80 per cent,
and 6 in addition to the high of 843 per cent were over 140 per cent. 62 Thus
the method of cost allocation can exert a great influence on the net prof-
its reported. The effect of different allocation methods is likely to be even
greater for the FTC data, since they specify many more lines and since their
categories do not generally conform to the lines determined by the com-
panies. Furthermore, alternative methods for allocating assets may (and will)
be employed. As a consequence, the variance in the profit rate on assets (a
key number) will be even greater.
c. The Lack of Coherence Between Accounting Numbers
and Economic Values
Expenses should reflect the opportunity costs of earning the revenue re-
ported. Assets should be valued at the cost of replacing their productive po-
tential. As is well known, accounting numbers often provide poor measures of
these values. Therefore, unless the magnitudes of the divergence between
economic values and the numbers reported is relatively small or can be ad-
justed, the LB figures will be misleading or meaningless for the purposes of
the program.
Two of the variables on which the FTC apparently intends to concentrate,
advertising and research and development, are particularly affected by ac-
counting. Accountants charge virtually all expenditures on these items (and
other expenditures for intangibles) to current expenses, even though they
recognize that many of the expenditures have future value, i.e., are assets.
Therefore, companies who once engaged in large amounts of advertising and
research that presently are generating sales and profits will report mislead-
ingly high rates of return on assets. Another source of divergence between
economic values and accounting numbers is the historical-cost method that,
until recently, the SEC insisted upon. Clearly, the practice of not adjusting
assets and liabilities for changes in the purchasing power of the dollar and for
changes in supply and demand distorts many figures. For example, older
companies that purchased fixed assets in the past will show lower-valued as-
sets, lower depreciation, and hence higher profits and higher rates of return
62. See Benston, supra note 54, at Table 7 for details.
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on assets than will newer companies, ceteris paribus. Consider also the case of a
mining company which purchased coal property many years ago. With the
greatly increased demand for coal, it will show a high rate of profit, since its
depletion charge is based on the original cost of the mine. The profit, though,
is due primarily to the company's having purchased the mine at what turned
out to be an advantageous time. Antitrust law enforcement officials and po-
tential entrants would not be able to distinguish a profit made from monopoly
or monopsony practice from one due to a fortunate purchase and historical-
cost-based accounting.
The total effect of the problems briefly described above can be consider-
able. For example, a 5 per cent overstatement or understatement of costs can
change an actual profit rate on sales or assets from 15 per cent to either 19
or 10 per cent. A 10 per cent overstatement or understatement of costs
changes the "true" 15 per cent rate to either 24 or 7 per cent. 63 These dif-
ferences in the rates of return would swamp the numbers that distinguish a
monopolistic from a competitive industry or a good from a bad investment.
CONCLUSION: TOTAL COSTS AND BENEFITS
I believe that the weight of the arguments and data rather strongly sup-
ports the conclusion that the costs to society of government-required disclo-
sure exceed the benefits that may be derived therefrom. This conclusion is
particularly strong for the FTC's line-of-business report program. The cost to
the corporations which would be required to report the data are high and the
benefits are nonexistent at best and probably negative. The costs of the
SEC-mandated disclosure are not as high, since the SEC generally permits
corporations to follow their usual record keeping formats. Unlike the FTC's
line-of-business program, it may have some positive benefits, on balance. Even
so, these benefits do not seem to offset the costs.
It is clear that government-mandated corporate financial disclosure pro-
grams are being extended rather than reduced. The committee established to
consider changes in the SEC's disclosure regulations 64 has primarily recom-
mended extensions of disclosure, though it has not recommended all that
was proposed to it. The FTC's efforts to require large corporations to com-
plete its forms are unrelenting, despite vigorous protests against its pro-
gram. A question that should be considered, therefore, is, Why is govern-
ment-required disclosure supported, despite its faults and costs? One answer
to this question, I believe, can be found in the answer to another question:
Who benefits from government-mandated disclosure? Another answer may be
63. See id. at Table II for a greater range of examples and for the formula on which these
numbers are based.
64. See REPORT, supra note 4.
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found in an analysis of the public's belief in the necessity for government
regulation.
One group of beneficiaries of government-mandated disclosure obviously
consists of the government agencies and agents who administer the laws and
use the data. Let me concede, at the outset, that many government employees
are honest, hard working, and public spirited. Therefore, they naturally come
to believe that the laws and regulations they administer are necessary, or at
least desirable, for the efficient and equitable functioning of that part of soci-
ety whose welfare is their charge. As they go about their jobs, they come to
see that some scoundrels avoid the intent of the laws and regulations, or they
find that the data they have are inadequate to answer some question. Hence
they ask for improved and more extensive disclosure. But it is not conceptu-
ally possible for the disclosure ever to be adequate. As is discussed very briefly
above, accounting numbers generally are poor measures of economic values
and almost any system of accounting measurement can be misused by mis-
creants. Nevertheless, more data are demanded of corporations because more
is almost always better than less to those who do not have to pay the cost of
production.
A second group of beneficiaries consists of those people outside of gov-
ernment who use the data but who also, like the regulators, do not have to
pay for it. SEC data are used by many (not all) securities analysts and by firms
who process the data for sale to the public. It is not surprising, therefore, to
find analysts among those who are most insistent on extending disclosure. For
example, the Fixed Income Analysts Society has proposed to the SEC Advi-
sory Committee on Corporate Disclosure that corporations be required to
"send annual and quarterly reports to holders of registered corporate bonds,
• . . disclose in annual and quarterly reports . . . information facilitating pro-
tection against defaults on payments of interest and of safety and market
value of principal," and so forth. 5 Their proposal seems curious, since these
requirements could be written into the bond indenture agreements. One
wonders, therefore, why bondholders have not asked for these data before,
unless they had determined that the cost of the information (which they
would pay for in reduced interest) was not worth the benefit. Analysts, how-
ever, work in the after-issue market. The required data would cost them
nothing.
Accountants and lawyers are other groups that benefit from the disclosure
required by the SEC. Both groups of professionals are in the business of sell-
ing their expertise, and the more extensive the regulations (up to a point), the
greater the demand for their services. However, the benefits to them of great-
65. FIXED INCOME ANALYSTS SOCIETY, COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE TO BOND INVESTORS AND ANALYSTS: A REPORT TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION AND TO THE SEC's ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 3-4 (1977).
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er disclosure are offset, in part, by the costs of greater legal liability and reg-
ulatory constraints. These costs have been imposed more on accountants than
on lawyers (thus far at least). Perhaps that is one reason why the accountants
have not been as supportive of extended SEC regulations as might have been
expected.
Economists who specialize in industrial organization are an important
group that hopes to benefit from the FTC's line-of-business data. These
economists conduct studies of the relationships among market structure and
profits, research and development expenditures, marketing, etc. The move-
ment of corporations towards conglomerate form has deprived them of data
on what they have been willing to describe as markets. Therefore, they look
towards the FTC's line-of-business data as a plentiful source of grist for their
mill. Since they neither have to pay the very high costs of producing these
data nor even submit a grant application for the required financing, their
interest is not surprising.
Finally, it is important to note that the public generally either (1) is un-
aware that the costs of required corporate disclosure are paid, ultimately, by
consumers in the form of higher prices for goods and services and higher
taxes; (2) overestimates the benefits and/or underestimates the costs; or (3)
believes that the benefits outweigh the costs. The first factor is understanda-
ble. The costs of required disclosures are small relative to other costs of pro-
duction. Therefore, even a doubling of disclosure costs that is reflected in
prices probably would not be noticed by consumers, particularly in a period
when inflation is so great and so variable. The second factor is also easily
explained. The benefits from required disclosure are extolled by government
officials, brokers, and analysts. Few voices are heard to the contrary. (Corpo-
rations do a very poor job in directing public attention to the effects of even
more costly government programs.) The third factor, I believe, stems from a
general feeling that the markets for goods, services, and capital essentially are
not competitive and are plagued with shady dealings or worse. Furthermore,
the economy is thought to be in need of control and regulation. These feel-
ings may be residues from the experience of the Great Depression, when
what was generally thought to be a competitive, free-enterprise, uncontrolled,
and well-functioning economy apparently failed. From that time, increasing
attention was paid to critics of the economy. The old beliefs were overthrown,
generally with as little evidence as had supported their previous acceptance.
But since the Second World War, a considerable body of analysis and empiri-
cal research has given us reason to question the assumption that the market
economy had failed in the 1920's and early 1930's. Furthermore, forty years
of experience with government regulation has provided evidence that its
promise is not often achieved. If evidence is effective in altering beliefs, we
have reason to hope for a change in the public's attitude towards the relative
benefits of regulated versus unregulated enterprise.
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